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Abstract: Machine learning algorithms have reached
mainstream status and are widely deployed in many ap-
plications. The accuracy of such algorithms depends sig-
nificantly on the size of the underlying training dataset;
in reality a small or medium sized organization often
does not have the necessary data to train a reasonably
accurate model. For such organizations, a realistic so-
lution is to train their machine learning models based
on their joint dataset (which is a union of the indi-
vidual ones). Unfortunately, privacy concerns prevent
them from straightforwardly doing so. While a num-
ber of privacy-preserving solutions exist for collaborat-
ing organizations to securely aggregate the parameters
in the process of training the models, we are not aware
of any work that provides a rational framework for the
participants to precisely balance the privacy loss and
accuracy gain in their collaboration.
In this paper, by focusing on a two-player setting, we
model the collaborative training process as a two-player
game where each player aims to achieve higher accu-
racy while preserving the privacy of its own dataset.
We introduce the notion of Price of Privacy, a novel ap-
proach for measuring the impact of privacy protection
on the accuracy in the proposed framework. Further-
more, we develop a game-theoretical model for different
player types, and then either find or prove the existence
of a Nash Equilibrium with regard to the strength of
privacy protection for each player. Using recommenda-
tion systems as our main use case, we demonstrate how
two players can make practical use of the proposed the-
oretical framework, including setting up the parameters
and approximating the non-trivial Nash Equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
As data have become more valuable than oil, everybody
wants to have a slice of it; Internet giants (e.g., Amazon,
Google, Netflix, etc.) and small businesses alike would
like to extract as much value from it as possible. Ma-
chine Learning (the process of learning from data and
making predictions about it by building a model) has
received much attention over the last decade, mostly
due to its vast application range such as recommen-
dation services, medicine, speech recognition, banking,
gaming, driving, and more. For Machine Learning tasks,
it is widely known that more training data will lead to
a more accurate model. Unfortunately, most organiza-
tions do not possess a dataset as large as Netflix’s or
Amazon’s. In such a situation, to obtain a relatively ac-
curate model, a natural solution would be to aggregate
all the data from different organizations on a centralized
server and train on the global dataset as seen on the
left side of Fig. 1. This approach is efficient, however,
data owners have a valid privacy concern about shar-
ing their data, particularly with new privacy regulations
such as the European General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR). Therefore, improving Machine Learning
via straightforward data aggregation is likely undesir-
able and potentially unlawful in reality. Various privacy
concerns exists with regard to Machine Learning (e.g.,
the privacy of the input to the training or the privacy
of the trained model); in this paper, we focus on the
privacy of the input for individual data contributors.
Fig. 1. Centralized (left) and Distributed (right) Learning
In the literature, Privacy Preserving Distributed
Machine Learning [PRR10, RA12, HCB16, MMR+16,
PZ16] have been proposed to solve this problem by
training the model locally and safely aggregating all the
local updates, illustrated on the right side of Fig. 1. On
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the other hand, these approaches’ efficiency depend on
the number of participants and the sample sizes as we
highlight this in the related works.
In this paper, we are interested in a scenario with
two participants, each of whom possesses a significant
amount of data and would like to obtain a more accu-
rate model than what they would obtain if training was
carried out in isolation. It is clear that the players will
only be interested in collaboration if they can actually
benefit from each other. To this end, we simply assume
that the players have already evaluated the quality of
each other’s datasets to make sure training together is
beneficial for both of them before the collaboration. How
such evaluation should be done is out of scope for our
research; there are best practices already established in
the field [HKP12]. Most of the Machine Learning pa-
pers, including privacy-preserving ones, implicitly make
this assumption.
1.1 Problem Statement
Collaborative Machine Learning will increase the model
accuracy, but at the cost of leaking some information
about the players’ datasets to each other. To miti-
gate the information leakage, players can apply some
privacy-preserving mechanisms, e.g., calibrating and
adding some noise or deleting some sensitive attributes.
Many “solutions” have been proposed, as surveyed in
the related work. In most of them, the players are not
provided with the option of choosing their own privacy
parameters. Clearly, there is a gap between these solu-
tions and reality, where players will have different pref-
erences to privacy and utility and may want to dynam-
ically set the parameters.
To bridge this gap, we consider the parties involved
as rational players and model their collaboration as a
two-player game. In our setting, players have their own
trade-offs with respect to their privacy and expected
utility and can flexibly set their own privacy parameters.
The central research problem is to propose a general
game theoretical model and find a Nash Equilibrium.
Moreover, given a specific Machine Learning task, we
should answer the following core questions.
– What are the potential ranges for privacy parame-
ters that make the collaborative Machine Learning
model more accurate than training alone?
– What is the optimal privacy parameter (which re-
sults in the highest payoff)?
– With this optimal parameter, how much accuracy
is lost overall due to the applied privacy-preserving
mechanisms?
1.2 Contribution
We first propose a two-player game theoretical model for
Collaborative Learning (a training process via an arbi-
trary training algorithm between two players). We pro-
file the players and analyze their best response strategies
and the equilibria of the designed game. Inspired by the
notion of Price of Anarchy [KP99], we define Price of
Privacy, which is a new way of measuring the accuracy
degradation due to privacy protection. Then, we demon-
strate the usage of the model via a recommender use
case, where two players improve their own recommen-
dation accuracy by leveraging on each other’s dataset.
It is worth noting that this is indeed a representative
example since the used Stochastic Gradient Descent op-
timization process is a universal procedure widely used
in Machine Learning tasks. For illustration purposes,
we consider two privacy preserving mechanisms, includ-
ing attribute deletion and differential privacy. Based
on heuristics, we demonstrate how to approximate the
privacy-accuracy trade-off functions, which lie in the
core of the proposed theoretical model and determine
how the players should set the parameters, and illus-
trate the practically obtained Nash Equilibrium.
We would like to emphasize that approximating the
privacy-accuracy trade-off function is a very realistic
choice in applying the proposed theoretical model. Sci-
entifically, we may want to use cryptographic techniques
such as secure two-party computation protocols to pre-
cisely compute these parameters. However, this is unde-
sirable due to the incurred complexity. In order to re-
duce complexity, most deployed Machine Learning sys-
tems implement heuristics, such as approximating the
parameters in Stochastic Gradient Descent [HKP12].
1.3 Organization
In Sec. 2, we review some basic concepts used through-
out the paper such as Game Theory and Differential Pri-
vacy. In Sec. 3, we introduce the Collaborative Learning
game, explain the parameters, and define the concept
of Price of Privacy. In Sec. 4, we provide a theoretical
analysis of the proposed game and investigate the Nash
Equilibrium. In Sec. 5, we introduce the recommender
use case and describe two example privacy-preserving
mechanisms. In Sec. 6, for the recommender use case,
we demonstrate how to determine the the privacy accu-
racy trade-off function via interpolation over the joint
dataset. Then, in Sec. 7 we show the corresponding equi-
librium by applying our game theoretic model. In Sec.
8, besides presenting the whole process required in ad-
vance of the collaboration, we show how to approximate
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the trade-off function via heuristics and study its im-
pact on the Nash Equilibrium. In Sec. 9, we review the
the related works from the perspective of game theory
and privacy-preserving machine learning. In Sec. 10, we
conclude the paper.
As we use multiple well-known concepts through the
paper, we provide a short summary of abbreviations in
App. A to improve readability.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce differential privacy and the
game theoretic terminology used in the paper.
2.1 Differential Privacy
DP [Dwo06] have been used widely in the literature.
It classically quantifies the privacy of a mechanism in
terms of parameters ε:
Definition (ε-differential privacy [Dwo06]). An algo-
rithm A is ε-DP (ε ∈ [0,∞)]) if for any two datasets
D1 and D2 that differ on a single element and for any
set of possible outputs O:
Pr(A(D1) ∈ O) ≤ eε · Pr(A(D2) ∈ O)
DP gives a strong guarantee that presence or absence of
a single data point will not change the final output of the
algorithm significantly. Furthermore, the combination of
DP mechanisms also satisfies DP:
Theorem (Composition Theorem [Dwo06]). If the
mechanisms Ai are εi-DP, then any sequential com-
bination of them is
∑
i εi-DP.
To achieve DP, noise must be added to the output of
the algorithm. In most cases, this noise is drawn from
a Laplacian distribution and it is proportional to the
sensitivity of the algorithm itself:
Theorem (Laplace Mechanism [Dwo06]). For f :
D → Rk, if s is the sensitivity of f (i.e., s =
maxD1,D2 ||f(D1)−f(D2)|| for any two datasets D1 and
D2 that differ on a single element) then the mechanism
A(D) = f(D) + Lap( sε ) with independently generated
noise to each of the k outputs enjoys ε-DP.
2.2 Game Theory
GT [HS+88] is “the study of mathematical models of
conflict between intelligent, rational decision-makers”.
Almost every multi-party interaction can be modeled
as a game. In our case, these decision makers are the
participants (players) of Collaborative Learning.
Definition (Game). A normal form representation of
a game is a tuple 〈N ,Σ,U〉, where N = {1, . . . ,m} is the
set of players, Σ = {S1, . . . , Sm} where Si = {s1, s2, . . . }
is the set of actions for player i and U = {u1, . . . , um}
is the set of payoff functions.
A Best Response (BR) strategy gives the most favorable
outcome for a player, taking other players’ strategies as
given:
Definition (Best Response). For a game 〈N ,Σ,U〉 the
BR strategy for player i for a given strategy vector
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sm) is sˆi if ∀sij ∈ Si:
ui(sˆi, s−i) ≥ ui(sij , s−i).
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy vector where all
the player’s strategies are BR strategies. In other words,
in a NE state every player makes the best/optimal de-
cision for itself as long as the others’ choices remain
unchanged:
Definition (Nash Equilibrium). A pure-strategy NE
of a game 〈N ,Σ,U〉 is a strategy vector (s∗1, . . . , s∗m)
where s∗i ∈ Si, such that for each player i
∀sij ∈ Si: ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ ui(sij , s∗−i) where s∗−i =
(s∗1, . . . , s∗i−1, s∗i+1, . . . , s∗m).
NE provides a way of predicting what will happen if
several entities are making decisions at the same time
where the outcome depends on the decisions of the oth-
ers. The existence of a NE means no player will gain
more by unilaterally changing its strategy at this unique
state.
Another concept of GT is Social Optimum, which
is a strategy vector that maximizes social welfare:
Definition (Social Optimum). The Social Optimum of
a game 〈N ,Σ,U〉 is a strategy vector (s′1, . . . , s′m) where
s′i ∈ Si, such that
max
s1∈S1,...,sm∈Sm
∑
n∈N
un(s1, . . . , sm) =
∑
n∈N
un(s′1, . . . , s′m)
Despite the fact that no one can do better by changing
strategy, NEs are not necessarily Social Optimums (as
an example see Prisoner’s Dilemma [HS+88]). Price of
Anarchy [KP99] measures the ratio between these two:
how the efficiency of a system degrades due to the selfish
behavior of its players:
Definition (Price of Anarchy). PoA of a game
〈N ,Σ,U〉 is
PoA :=
maxs∈S
∑
n∈N un(s)
mins∗∈S∗
∑
n∈N un(s∗)
where S = S1×· · ·×Sm is the set of all possible outcomes
while S∗ is the set of NEs.
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3 Game Theoretic Model
In this section, we describe the Collaborative Learning
(CoL) game which captures the actions of two privacy-
aware data holders in the scenario of applying an ar-
bitrary privacy preserving mechanism and training al-
gorithm on their datasets. We define the corresponding
utility functions and elaborate on its components. Fur-
thermore, we introduce the notion of Price of Privacy,
a novel measure of the effect of privacy protection on
the accuracy of players.
3.1 The Collaborative Learning Game
At a high level, the players’ goal in the CoL game is to
maximize their utility, which is a function of the model
accuracy and the privacy loss. We do not consider the
adversarial aspect of players, hence the gain includes
only the accuracy improvements on the model for a par-
ticular player as benefit (without the accuracy decrease
of the other player1) while the cost is private informa-
tion leakage: the trained model leaks some information
about the local dataset used for training.
Players only choose the privacy parameters for a
predetermined privacy preserving method M (rather
than choosing the method and the parameter). This
means each M corresponds to a different game with a
different definition of privacy, rather than having one
game where the players’ actions are deciding which
mechanism to use and to what extent. This is a re-
stricted scenario, nonetheless, even this scenario barely
lends itself to purely analytical treatment; it is already
not straightforward to derive the exact NE.
Variable Meaning
M Privacy mechanism applied by the players
pn Privacy parameter for player n
CMn Privacy weight for player n
Bn Accuracy weight for player n
θn Accuracy by training alone for player n
ΦMn (p1, p2) Accuracy by training together for player n
b(θn,ΦMn ) Benefit function for player n
cM (pn) Privacy loss function for player n
Table 1. Parameters of the CoL game
The variables of the CoL game are listed in Tab. 1,
where the accuracy is measured as the prediction error
of the trained model: lower θn and ΦMn correspond to
a more accurate model. Maximal privacy protection is
1 Extending the game for competing companies is an interesting
future direction.
represented via pn = 1, while pn = 0 means no pro-
tection for player n. The benefit and the privacy loss
are not on the same scale as the first depends on the
accuracy while the latter on information loss. To make
them comparable, we introduce weight parameters: the
benefit function is multiplied with the accuracy weight
Bn > 0, while the privacy loss function is multiplied
with the privacy weight CMn ≥ 0.
The collaborative accuracy ΦMn (p1, p2) naturally de-
pends also on the datasets and the used algorithm be-
sides the privacy parameters pn and the corresponding
privacy mechanism M . However, for simplicity we ab-
stract them since it does not affect our theoretical anal-
ysis as long as ΦMn is symbolic.
Definition 1 (Collaborative Learning game). The
CoL game is a tuple 〈N ,Σ,U〉, where the set of play-
ers is N = {1, 2}, their actions are Σ = {p1, p2}
where p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1] while their utility functions are
U = {u1, u2} such that for n ∈ N :
un(p1, p2) = Bn · b(θn,ΦMn (p1, p2))− CMn · cM (pn) (1)
The CoL game is of symmetric information, i.e., the in-
troduced parameters are public knowledge (i.e., M , Bn,
CMn , b, cM , θn and ΦMn ) except for the actions of the
players (i.e., pn). Moreover, we do not consider any neg-
ative effect of the training such as time or electricity con-
sumption, however, such variables may be introduced to
the model in the future.
In the following, whenever possible, we simplify the
notion CMn , cM and ΦMn by removing the symbol M to
use Cn, c and Φn respectively. We only need to keep
in mind that these functions depend on the underly-
ing privacy-preserving mechanism M in the implemen-
tation.
3.1.1 Privacy Loss Function cM (pn)
This function represents the loss due to private data
leakage. We define c with the following natural proper-
ties:
Definition 2 (Privacy loss function). c : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
such that it is continuous and twice differentiable, c(0) =
1, c(1) = 0 and ∂pnc < 0.
This definition indicates that the maximal potential
leakage is 1 which corresponds to no protection at all,
while maximal privacy protection corresponds to zero
privacy loss. Furthermore, c is monotone decreasing
which means more privacy protection corresponds to
less privacy loss.
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3.1.2 Benefit Function b(θn,ΦMn )
The benefit function has two inputs: the accuracy
achieved by training alone (θn) and when both play-
ers train together (Φn). Since a rational player would
not collaborate to end up with a model of lower accu-
racy, we are only interested in the case when Φn < θn
(Note, that accuracy is measured as prediction error:
lower values correspond to higher accuracy.). We define
b with the following natural properties:
Definition 3 (Benefit function). b : R+ × R+ → R+0
such that it is continuous and twice differentiable,
∂pnb ≤ 0 and b(θn,Φn) = 0 if θn ≤ Φn.
This definition indicates that there is no benefit when
the accuracy of the model trained together is lower than
the accuracy of the model trained alone. Furthermore,
since b is monotone decreasing in pn, more privacy pro-
tection results in lower benefit due to decreased accu-
racy.
3.1.3 Privacy-Accuracy Trade-off Function
ΦMn (p1, p2)
Φn plays a crucial role in the benefit function b. How-
ever, the function of how a privacy protection mech-
anism affects a complex training algorithm (and con-
sequently the accuracy) is unique for each dataset and
algorithm. Although we measure it in Sec. 6, interpolate
it in Sec. 7 and approximate it in Sec. 8 for a recom-
mendation system use case, in general the exact form of
Φn is unknown. On the other hand, some properties are
expected:
Definition 4 (Privacy-Accuracy trade-off function).
Φn : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → R+ such that it is continuous,
twice differentiable and:
– ∃m ∈ N : pm = 1⇒ ∀n ∈ N : Φn(p1, p2) ≥ θn
– ∀n,m ∈ N : ∂pmΦn > 0
– ∀n ∈ N : θn > Φn(0, 0)
The first property means that maximal privacy pro-
tection cannot result in higher accuracy than training
alone for any player. The second property indicates that
higher privacy protection corresponds to lower accuracy
since Φn is monotone increasing in both p1 and p2. The
last property ensures that training together with no pri-
vacy corresponds to higher accuracy than training alone.
3.2 The Concept of Price of Privacy
Inspired by the notion of Price of Anarchy [KP99], we
define Price of Privacy to measure the accuracy loss due
to privacy constraints:
Definition 5 (Price of Privacy). PoP measures the
overall effect of privacy protection on the accuracy:
PoP (p∗1, p∗2) := 1−
∑
n b(θn,Φn(p∗1, p∗2))∑
n b(θn,Φn(0, 0))
(2)
The quotient is between the total accuracy improvement
in a NE (p∗1, p∗2) and the total accuracy improvement
without privacy protection.
Due to the Def. 3 and 4, PoP ∈ [0, 1] where 0 cor-
responds the highest possible accuracy which can be
achieved via collaboration with no privacy while 1 cor-
responds the lowest possible accuracy which can be
achieved by training alone. In other words, Price of Pri-
vacy evaluates the benefit of a given equilibrium. The
lower its value is, the higher the accuracy achieved by
collaboration.
Note that while PoA characterizes the whole game,
PoP is a property of a NE. Also, since Φn can only
be estimated in a real-world scenario, the players can
only approximate the value of PoP , which would then
measure the efficiency of the collaboration.
3.3 Remarks on the Model
Given that the actual value of Φn is required to com-
pute the optimal strategies, Φn has to be numerically
evaluated for putting the CoL game to practical use.
Different from other parameters which can be set freely,
the impact of the privacy-preserving mechanism M on
the joint accuracy (and thus Φn) is determined by both
datasets. Precisely computing this function requires ac-
cess to the joint dataset; thus, it raises the very privacy
concern which we want to mitigate in the first place.
To break this loop, we propose to adopt an approxi-
mation approach for applying the model. To this end,
we provide a solution heuristic and show its practical
feasibility in Sec. 8.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we characterize the NEs for a simple and
more complex cases of the CoL game. We derive sym-
bolic NEs in closed form for the case where exactly one
of the players is privacy-concerned (i.e., Collaboration-
as-a-Service scenario). Next, we prove the existence of a
pure strategy NE in the general case, where both play-
ers are privacy-concerned to a given degree. To preserve
clarity, all mathematical proofs for theorems in this sec-
tion are given in App. B.
The simplest NE of the CoL game is no collabora-
tion:
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Theorem 1. Applying maximal privacy protection
(training alone) in the CoL game is a NE: (p∗1, p∗2) =
(1, 1).
Clearly, when the players train alone there will be no
improvement in accuracy. This means that the Price of
Privacy for this NE is the maximum 1: the entire poten-
tial accuracy improvement is lost due to privacy protec-
tion. This finding seemingly contradicts [CGL15], which
states that all players refraining to participate cannot be
an equilibrium. There is a significant difference though;
estimation cost is a public good in [CGL15], while in
our case accuracy is private and each participant has a
base accuracy level obtained by training alone.
4.1 Player Types
Based on the properties of CoL game, two natural ex-
pectations arise:
– A player prefers collaboration if it values accuracy
significantly more than privacy (Bn  Cn).
– A player prefers training alone if it values accuracy
significantly less than privacy (Bn  Cn).
These intuitions are captured in the following two lem-
mas:
Lemma 1. ∃αn ≥ 0 such that if CnBn ≤ αn for player n
than its BR is pˆn = 0.
Lemma 2. ∃βn ≥ 0 such that if CnBn ≥ βn for player n
then its BR is to set pˆn = 1.
The questions we are interested in answering are: what
are the exact values of αn and βn and what is the NE
in case αn ≤ CnBn ≤ βn. Based on the ratio
Cn
Bn
∈ [0,∞],
we define two types of players:
– Unconcerned: This type of player cares only about
accuracy. This represents the case when CnBn = 0: the
privacy weight for player n is zero (Cn = 0).
– Concerned: This player is more privacy-aware, as
the privacy loss is present in its utility function. This
represents the case when CnBn > 0.
This information is available to both players as the CoL
game is a symmetric information game: both players
know which type of player they face.
4.2 One Player is Privacy Concerned
Definition 6 (Collaboration-as-a-Service). In a CaaS
scenario one player acts as a for-profit service provider
of collaborative training without privacy concerns, i.e.,
its privacy weight is 0.
Example. Imagine a company who offers CaaS for her
own profit (Player 2). The CaaS provider does not ap-
ply any privacy-preserving mechanism (see Th. 2). Any
interested party (Player 1) who wants to to boost its ac-
curacy can use this service. At the same time, Player
1 requires additional privacy protection (besides the in-
herent complexity of the training algorithm) to prevent
her own data from leaking.
Theorem 2 (Training as an unconcerned player). If
player n is unconcerned (Cn = 0) then its BR is to
collaborate without any privacy protection: pˆn = 0.
When both players are unconcerned (C1 = C2 = 0),
(p∗1, p∗2) = (0, 0) is a NE. The corresponding Price of
Privacy value is 0 as no accuracy is lost due to privacy
protection.
As a result, the unconcerned player do not apply
any privacy-preserving mechanism. Without loss of gen-
erality we assume Player 2 is unconcerned, so its BR is
pˆ2 = 0. This allows us to make the following simplifica-
tions: Φ(p1) := Φ1(p1, pˆ2), b(p1) := b(θ1,Φ(p1, pˆ2)) and
u(p1) := u1(p1, pˆ2) while f ′ = ∂p1f and f ′′ = ∂2p1f .
Theorem 3 (Training with an unconcerned player).
A NE of the CoL game when Player 1 is concerned
(C1 > 0) while Player 2 is unconcerned (C2 = 0) is
(p∗1, p∗2) = (ρ, 0) where ρ is defined by Eq. (3) where
[·]−1 is the inverse function of [·] and r = C1B1 :
ρ =

[
b′Φ′
c′
]−1
(r) if
u′′(ρ) < 0
ρ ∈ [0, 1]
u(ρ) > 0
0 if b(0) > r
1 otherwise
(3)
The three possible NEs when Player 2 is unconcerned,
and the corresponding Price of Privacy values are:
– If the possible maximal benefit is higher than the
weight ratio (b(0) > C1B1 ) for Player 1, this player
should train without any privacy protection since
(p∗1, p∗2) = (0, 0) is a NE. In this case PoP = 0.
– If all the required conditions in Th. 3 hold, (p∗1, p∗2) =([
b′Φ′
c′
]−1 (
C1
B1
)
, 0
)
is a NE with
PoP = 1−
∑
n b
(
θn,Φn
([
b′Φ′
c′
]−1 (
C1
B1
)
, 0
))
∑
n b(θn,Φn(0, 0))
– Otherwise (p∗1, p∗2) = (1, 0) is a NE. In this case,
when one player apply maximal privacy protection
(Player 1), the other player’s utility cannot be pos-
itive due to the Def. 4. Furthermore, since Player 2
is privacy unconcerned, its actual payoff is 0 inde-
pendently of its action. As a result, (p∗1, p∗2) = (1, p2)
is a NE for all p2 ∈ [0, 1] as they all correspond to
the same 0 payoff. For simplicity, we use (1, 1) to
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represent this case (the players train alone), where
the corresponding PoP value is 1.
This result is quite abstract because all the components
of the utility function are treated symbolically. How-
ever, even if we specify the benefit and the privacy loss
functions, the privacy-accuracy trade-off function Φn
would still be unknown due to the unspecified train-
ing algorithm. We show this in the next Cor. where we
set b and c to be linear, as it is shown in Eq. (4) where
[·]+ = max{·, 0}.
c(pn) := 1− pn
b(θn,Φn(p1, p2)) := [θn − Φn(p1, p2)]+
(4)
Corollary. With the same notations as in Th. 3 and
with the benefit and privacy loss functions defined in Eq.
(4), (p∗1, p∗2) = (ρ, 0) is a NE when C1 > 0 and C2 = 0 if
ρ is:
ρ =
 0 if r ≤ θ1 −Φ(0)[Φ′]−1 (r) if Φ′′ (r) < 0, u1(ρ, 0) > 0, ρ ∈ [0, 1]1 otherwise
To compute the exact (numerical) NE and the corre-
sponding PoPPrice of Privacy of the CoL game, we
need to define the function Φn. While for simpler train-
ing algorithms Φn is known [IL13, CGL15], for more
complex algorithms it can only be approximated. We
demonstrate a potential approximation method called
self-division in Sec. 8.
4.3 Both Players are Privacy Concerned
Now we consider the general case when both players’
privacy weights are non-zero. We prove the existence of
a pure-strategy NE besides the trivial (p∗1, p∗2) = (1, 1);
we utilize the chain rule of derivation for higher dimen-
sions and a result from the theory of potential games
[MS96].
Lemma (Chain Rule). If f : R2 → R and g : R2 → R
are differentiable functions, then
∀i ∈ [1, 2] : ∂xif(x, g(x1, x2)) = ∂gf · ∂xig(x1, x2)
Definition (Potential Game [MS96]). A two-player
game G is a potential game if the mixed second or-
der partial derivative of the utility functions are equal:
∂p1∂p2u1 = ∂p1∂p2u2 (5)
Theorem (Monderer & Shapley [MS96]). Every po-
tential game admits at least one pure-strategy NE.
Now we can state the theorem which holds even if both
players are privacy-concerned:
Theorem 4. The CoL game has at least one non-trivial
pure-strategy NE if
∂2Φb ·(∂p1Φ1−∂p2Φ2) = ∂Φb ·(∂p1∂p2Φ2−∂p1∂p2Φ1) (6)
Corollary (1). If we assume ∂ip1Φ1 = ∂ip2Φ2 for i ∈
{1, 2} then Th. 4 holds.
The condition on the derivatives of Φn in Cor. 1 means
that the player’s accuracy changes the same way in rela-
tion to their own privacy parameter, independently from
the other player’s privacy parameter. In Sec. 6 we mea-
sure the accuracy for multiple privacy parameter values
and find that this is indeed the case. Moreover, we find
that Φ1 ≈ Φ2 when the players have equal dataset sizes.2
4.4 Remarks on the NEs
Note that a non-trivial pure-strategy NE does not nec-
essarily correspond to positive payoffs: if ∃n ∈ N :
un(p∗1, p∗2) < 0 then player n would rather not collab-
orate. Instead, it would train alone and gain 0. This
situation is plausible since 0 utility corresponds to the
accuracy of the locally trained model. As such, an actual
accuracy improvement is not trivial by collaboration, es-
pecially with additional privacy concerns (as we show in
Sec. 6).
5 Use Case: Recommendation
System
In this section, we describe our recommender use case
(RecSys), where Machine Learning (ML) is performed
through Matrix Factorization (MF) via Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent (SGD). Then, we introduce two example
privacy-preserving mechanisms: Suppression (Sup) and
bounded DP (bDP).
5.1 The Learning Process
Fig. 2. Learning Sequentially
2 Note that these findings are empirical: based on the specific
datasets/algorithm we used. For more details see Sec. 6.
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If there are only two parties in a distributed learning
scenario (right side of Fig. 1), the trained model reveals
some information about both players’ dataset. Hence,
in our scenario, the players train the same model iter-
atively without any safe aggregation. If there are only
two participants, parallelization does not improve the
efficiency much, so the players are training the model se-
quentially as seen in Fig. 2. The problem of information
leakage is tackled with privacy-preserving mechanisms.
Our use case is a RecSys scenario. We assume that
players hold a user-item rating matrix with a common
item-set I = I1 = I2 and disjoint user-set: U1 ∩ U2 = ∅
where U = U1 ∪ U2. As usual, rui ∈ R|U |×|I| refers to
the rating user u gives item i.
The goal of the learning algorithm is to find the
items that users desire. One of the most widespread
method to do that is MF [KBV09] as seen in Fig. 3:
finding P|U |×κ and Qκ×|I| such that P ·Q ≈ R. As the
user-sets are disjoint, players only need to share the item
feature matrix Q.
Fig. 3. RecSyS Scenario
The goal of a RecSys algorithm is to minimize the
error between the prediction and the observed ratings
as described in Eq. (7) where λ is the regularization pa-
rameter, while pu (qi) is the corresponding row (column)
in P (Q) for rui.
min
P,Q
∑
rui∈R
(rui − puqi)2 + λ(||pu||2 + ||qi||2) (7)
One of the most popular techniques to minimize this
formula is SGD. It works by iteratively selecting a ran-
dom rating rui ∈ R and updating the corresponding fac-
tor vectors according to Eq. (8) where eiu = puqi − rui
and γ is the learning rate.
p′u := pu + γ(euiqj − λpu)
q′i := qi + γ(euipu − λqi)
(8)
Since we use SGD, the training process shown in
Fig. 2 is essentially equivalent to mini-batch learning
where the batches are the datasets of the players. As
we use RecSys as an illustrative example, we simplify
it: we assume that players share the learning algorithm
which is embedded with the necessary parameters such
as learning rate γ, regularization parameter λ, number
of features κ, and maximum number of iterations ι. No-
tations are summarized in Tab. 2.
Variable Meaning
U Joint user-set
I Itemset
R Rating matrix
rui Rating of user u for item i
P,Q Feature matrices
γ Learning rate
λ Regularization parameter
κ Number of features
ι Number of iterations
Table 2. RecSys Parameters
5.2 Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
We focus on input manipulation for privacy preserva-
tion as we are concerned with input data privacy. In fact,
[FBK16] concluded that input perturbation achieves the
most efficient accuracy-privacy trade-off amongst vari-
ous DP mechanisms. We investigate Sup and bDP as
available mechanisms.
5.2.1 Suppression
Definition 7 (Suppression). Sup removes input data
from the original dataset to protect it from information
leakage resulting from the model or the learning pro-
cess. The size of reduction is determined by the privacy
parameter p ∈ [0, 1], i.e., p is proportional to the data
removed3.
Sup essentially chooses a subset of the dataset to be used
for training together. Sup can be used to remove sensi-
tive data from the dataset, so even if the other player
can reconstruct the dataset from the trained model, the
removed part remains fully protected.
5.2.2 Bounded Differential Privacy
To apply bDP, we must determine the sensitivity of the
machine learning algorithm first:
Theorem 5 (Sensitivity of RecSys). The sensitivity S
of the introduced RecSys scenario is
S ≤ κ · ι · γ · (∆r · pmax − λ · qmax) (9)
Proof Th. 5. See App. C.
3 We treat p as a continuous variable even though it is discrete;
this does not affect our analysis owing to large dataset sizes.
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Now, we consider the bDP mechanism [FBK16]:
Definition 8 (bounded DP). bDP aims to hide the
value of a rating. To achieve ε-bDP, each rating is mod-
ified as it is shown in Eq. (10) where L(x) is a Laplacian
noise with 0 mean and x variance.
r′ui :=
rmax if rui + L(
S
ε
) ≥ rmax
rmin if rui + L(Sε ) ≤ rmin
rui + L(Sε ) otherwise
(10)
5.3 Unifying Privacy Parameters
These approaches are hard to compare since they fo-
cus on protecting different things. Sup aims to provide
maximal privacy for some of the data while leaving the
rest unprotected. On the other hand, bDP provides an
equal amount of privacy for all the data based on the
parameter ε. In the CoL game we defined the privacy
parameter on a scale 0 to 1, therefore the specific param-
eters of Sup and bDP must be mapped to [0, 1] where
p = 0 means no privacy, while p = 1 stands for full pri-
vacy protection. For Sup the value p is straightforward:
p represents the portion of data removed. Hiding the
dataset in whole (100% protection) means p = 1 while
if the whole dataset is used for training (0% protection)
then p = 0.
In case of bDP, 100% privacy (p = 1) is achieved
when ε = 0 (infinite noise) while ε ≈ ∞ corresponds
to zero noise (p = 0). This relation can be captured
via a function f : [0,∞) → [0, 1] such that f(0) = 1,
limx→∞ f(x) = 0 and f is monotone decreasing. We
use the mapping p = f(ε) = 1ε+1 and ε = f−1(p) =
1
p − 1. This mapping does not carry meaning such as
equivalence in any sense between methods, so it is not
used for direct comparison. We only use it to convert
the privacy parameter ε into [0, 1] so we can use bDP as
privacy-preserving method M in the CoL game defined
in Sec. 3.
6 Determining Φ for RecSys
For all research questions in Sec. 1 answers depend on
ΦMn . Consequently, in this section we measure the model
accuracy for various privacy parameters with regard to
the learning task and the privacy mechanisms intro-
duced in Sec. 5.
For our experiments, we implemented SGD as train-
ing algorithm in Matlab [Pej18]. We used the MovieLens
1M [Gro03] and Netflix [Net09] datasets; we shrunk the
Netflix dataset to 10% by randomly filtering out 90%
of the users. Furthermore, both datasets are prepro-
cessed similarly to [FBK16]. Preprocessing is described
in details in App. D. We will refer to the preprocessed
datasets as 1M and NF10, respectively. The parameters
of the preprocessed datasets are shown in Tab. 3.
Dataset Rating User Item Density
1M 998 539 6040 3260 0.051
NF10 10 033 823 46 462 16 395 0.013
Table 3. The Datasets Size after Preprocessing
The algorithm for MF is SGD, where the number of
features are κ = 4. The algorithm runs for 20 iterations
(ι = 20) with learning rate γ = 0.0075 and regularization
parameter λ = 0.01. The feature matrices are bounded
by pmax = qmax = 0.5. This means that the sensitivity
of the RecSys scenario is S ≤ 4 · 20 · 0.0075 · (2 · 2 · 0.5−
0.01 · 0.5) = 1.197 as a result of Th. 5.
We assume if a model is trained using datasets
from very different distributions, the model captures the
properties of the mixed distribution of the combined
dataset (which might be far from the original distri-
butions). On the other hand, using training data from
similar distributions results in capturing the statistical
properties of a distribution close to the original ones.
As such, if the players’ datasets are from a similar dif-
ferent distribution, training together likely results in a
more accurate model than training alone. Consequently,
we imitate the players’ datasets by splitting 1M and
NF10: each user with its corresponding ratings is as-
signed to one of the players. To remove the effect of
randomness of the dataset division, we run our experi-
ments three times and only present the averages. Now,
each player splits its dataset further into a training set
(80%) and a verification set (20%). The players can run
the SGD algorithm alone or together, where additional
privacy mechanisms can be deployed. The accuracy of
the trained model is measured via root mean square er-
ror: RMSE =
√∑
e2
iu
|R| .
6.1 Alone vs Together
First, we compare the achieved accuracy with and with-
out the other player’s data in Fig. 4. The horizontal
axis represents the ratio of the user-set sizes: how 1M
and NF10 was split into two. More precisely, x = αβ
represents that Player 1’s dataset is αβ times the size
of Player 2’s dataset. The vertical axis shows the nor-
malized accuracy difference between training alone and
together: y = θn−Φ
M
n
θn
. In other words, y is the accuracy
improvement via training together; y = 0 represents the
accuracy of training alone.
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Fig. 4. Accuracy improvement (y axis) of training together using
1M/NF10 datasets where one player has x times more (less) data
than the other (x axis)
It is clear that training together is superior to train-
ing alone for both datasets and all size ratios. Fig. 4 also
shows that the owner of the smaller dataset benefits
more from collaboration; a well-expected characteristic.
6.2 One Player is Privacy Concerned
Training together achieves higher accuracy than train-
ing alone. The question is, how does the situation change
with a privacy mechanism in place. First we analyze the
CaaS scenario introduced in Def. 6. Without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume p2 = 0. Player 1’s options are
either to set p1 for Sup or ε1 for bDP.
Fig. 5. Accuracy improvements of training together (y axis) for
different privacy levels (x axis) with the 1M dataset is divided
such that the data size ratios are 0.25, 1 and 4
Fig. 5 shows the tradeoff between accuracy and pri-
vacy when the 1M dataset is divided such that the data
size ratio is 0.25, 1 and 4 (from Player 1’s perspective).
The horizontal axis is the privacy parameter p1 (ε1)
while the vertical axis shows the normalized improve-
ment on accuracy achieved by training together (similar
to Fig. 4). In Fig. 5, we can observe both higher (y > 0)
and lower (y < 0) collaborative accuracy regions. Note,
that we only show the case for 1M and select dataset
size ratios as we found that using other size ratios or
the NF10 dataset produce similar curves. The main ob-
servation is valid in all settings: as the dataset size ratio
increases the accuracy improvement decreases.
These results suggest that the realistic privacy pa-
rameters the players can apply (to obtain a more accu-
rate model) depend on the relative size of their datasets:
a player with relatively smaller dataset (e.g., triangle in
Fig. 5) can apply a stronger privacy parameter (and
still obtain more accurate model) than a player with a
relatively larger dataset (e.g., circle in Fig. 5).
This finding confirms our assumption about the
derivatives of ΦMn in Cor. 1: since the relative dataset
size effects the obtained accuracy with a constant, a
change in the privacy parameter effects the accuracy the
same way independently of these ratios. This is indeed
implies that ∂p1ΦM1 = ∂p2ΦM2 .
6.3 Both Players are Privacy Concerned
In this section we jointly train a model where both play-
ers employ the same mechanism M with privacy level
p1 (ε1) and p2 (ε2). Sec. 6.1 and 6.2 already pointed out
that a player with a significantly larger dataset would
not benefit much from collaboration. Consequently, for
this experiment we use datasets with similar sizes. This
makes our scenario symmetric, i.e., it is enough to
demonstrate the accuracy change for one player. We ob-
tained results for both 1M and NF10, but due to their
similarity we only display the results for 1M in Fig. 6.
We use the notation pown (εown) and pother (εother) to
represent the privacy parameters from the perspective
of the player under scrutiny.
Fig. 6 shows the normalized accuracy improvement
for different privacy parameters with privacy mechanism
M ∈ {Sup, bDP}. It is visible that independently from
M , accuracy is more sensitive to the player’s own pri-
vacy parameter than to that of the other.
These results suggest that a player’s data is more
useful to herself than to the other player. In other words,
by degrading the quality of a given player’s data (via a
privacy mechanism), this player’s accuracy will be af-
fected more than the accuracy of the other player. This
means, if the players would have additional incentive to
undermine the other player’s accuracy (e.g., competing
companies), by doing so they would actually decrease
their own accuracy more.
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Fig. 6. Accuracy improvement of collaboration (when 1M was
split equally) where 0 represents the accuracy level of training
alone. The applied mechanisms are Sup and bDP, respectively
7 Theory meets Practice
Using the obtained values of ΦMn from Sec. 6, it is pos-
sible to interpolate the privacy-accuracy trade-off func-
tion and determine numerical NEs. In this section, we
interpolate ΦMn for the RecSys scenario using the empir-
ical results from Sec. 6 and combine it with the results
in Sec. 4 to obtain exact equilibria.
7.1 Interpolation via Experiments
As an example, we set b and c are defined linear as in Eq.
(4). Now, we interpolate directly b instead of ΦMn , i.e.,
we interpolate the percentage-wise improvement differ-
ence θn−Φ
M
n
θn
shown in Fig. 6. We use Mathematica’s4
built-in Interpolate function with InterpolationOrder→ 1
setting in order to have a monotone approximation
which is required by Def. 3. Via this interpolation the
exact NE can be determined for the specific dataset and
algorithm defined in Sec. 5. In the rest of this section
we calculate the precise NE when 1M dataset is split
equally between the players.
7.2 One Player is Privacy Concerned
In this CaaS scenario we assume Player 1 is privacy
unconcerned. Due to Th. 2, this player’s BR is pˆ1 = 0.
Now the utility function of Player 2 is:
u2(0, p2) = B2 ·
b(0,p2)︷ ︸︸ ︷[
θ2 − Φ(0, p2)
θ2
]+
−C2 · c(p2) (11)
As Lemma 1 and 2 states, there is a lower and upper
bound on C2B2 for Player 2 which ensures that the BR pˆ2
is either 0 or 1. We determine the exact bounds using
our interpolation. Furthermore the utility of Player 2
(Eq. (11)) has to be positive as it is stated in Th. 3,
otherwise there is no incentive for Player 2 to partici-
pate in the CoL process. These limits are visible Tab. 4
where the right side shows the bounds corresponding to
Lemma 1 and 2 for both privacy method while the left
side corresponds to the non-negativity condition on the
utility of Player 2. These bounds on C2B2 are also visible
in Fig. 7 where B2 = 1.
0 ≤ u2(0, pˆ2) if pˆ2 if
C2
B2
≤ 0.990 Sup 0
C2
B2
≤ 1.400
1 C2
B2
≥ 1.827
C2
B2
≤ 1.150 bDP 0
C2
B2
≤ 0.349
1 C2
B2
≥ 2.251
Table 4. NEs for Player 2 when Player 1 is privacy unconcerned
In Fig. 7 we display the BR with its corresponding
utility when the utility function is normalized by B2
(i.e., B2 = 1) as in the proof of Th. 4. This transforma-
tion keeps the sign, i.e., if the utility negative, the BR is
not a NE, since no collaboration corresponds to higher
utility.
As it is visible, in case of Sup the interval defined
by the two lemmas (represented by the two vertical thin
gray line) are corresponding to negative utility, so for
this privacy mechanisms the NE is either collaboration
4 https://www.wolfram.com/mathematica/
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without privacy protection or no collaboration, depend-
ing on the weight ratio. More precisely, according to
Th. 3 the NE is (p∗1, p∗2) = (0, 0) if C2B2 ≤ b(θ2,Φ2(0, 0)) =
0.990 and (p∗1, p∗2) = (1, 1) otherwise.
In case of bDP, some part of the interval created
by the lemmas corresponds to positive utility, i.e., there
exists a non-trivial NE. More precisely, if 0.349 ≤ C2B2 ≤
1.150 then p∗2 is neither 0 nor 1. Note, that the BR
function is step-like because of the piecewise linear in-
terpolation. As such, within this interval the NE is
p∗2 = 0.2 ⇔ ε∗2 = 4. The Prive of Privacy of this NE
is PoP (0, 0.2) = 0.066, so due to privacy concerns less
than 7% of the overall achievable accuracy is lost.
Fig. 7. BR and the corresponding utility for Player 2 when Player
1 is privacy unconcerned
7.3 Both Player are Privacy Concerned
In this section we will focus on bDP privacy mechanism.
Th. 4 states that when both player is privacy concerned
a non-trivial NE exists. To find it, we will use BR dy-
namics [HS+88]. This will eventually converge to a NE
due to the following theorem:
Theorem (Monderer & Shapley [MS96]). In a finite5
potential game, from an arbitrary initial outcome, the
BR dynamics converges to a pure strategy NE.
5 As the CoL game is not finite, we discretized the actions
spaces of the players with floating point numbers.
In BR dynamics the players update their strategies in
the next round based on the their BRs to the strategy
what the other player played last round. We start the
iteration from (p1, p2) = (0, 0)6 and update the players’s
strategies alternately starting with Player 1. The NEs
where the process converged are visible in Tab. 5 with
the corresponding Price of Privacy values for discrete
weight ratios {0, 0.1, . . . }.
C2
B2
∈ → [0, 0.3] [0.4, 0.9] [1,∞]
C1
B1
∈ [0, 0.3] (0, 0) (0, 0.2) (1, 1)
0.000 0.066 1.000
C1
B1
∈ [0.4, 0.9] (0.2, 0) (0.2, 0.2) (1, 1)
0.066 0.131 1.000
C1
B1
∈ [1,∞] (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 5. NEs for different weight ratios
These approximated result suggests that players
with low privacy weight prefers to train together with-
out any protection while high privacy weight ensures
no collaboration. Furthermore, the narrow interval in-
between corresponds to collaboration with very limited
privacy protection (e.g., ε = 4) or no collaboration at
all.
8 Approximating Φ in Practice
Direct interpolation is only possible when both datasets
are fully available. In a real-world scenario ΦMn must be
approximated by other means. In this section, besides a
short overview of the whole process before collaboration,
we demonstrate a simple approach to fill the gap in the
CoL game caused by the obscurity of ΦMn .
Note, that our intention is not to provide a sound
method to approximate the effect of privacy mechanisms
on the accuracy of complex training algorithms, but
rather to show a direction how it could be done. More
research is required in this direction, and we consider
this to be an interesting future work.
8.1 Heuristic Parameters
As we argued in Sec. 6, we can assume that the player’s
datasets are from similar distributions, i.e., the players
can imitate CoL by mimicking the player’s datasets via
splitting their own datasets into two and approximate
ΦMn locally.
6 The higher the privacy level from where the BR dynamics
starts, the bigger the interval of weight ratios in which case it
converges to 1 (i.e., no collaboration).
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Based on empirical results, we establish a heuristic
formula which minimizes the error of this local approx-
imation based on the size and density of the players’
datasets. The formula can be seen in Eq. (12) where d is
the density of the datasets and Dn is player n’s dataset.
The details of the related experiment can be found in
App. E. We refer to the true privacy-accuracy trade-off
function as ΦMn and our approximation via self-division
as Φ˜Mn .
100 000 ≈ d · |Dn| = |Dn|
2
|Un| · |I| (12)
8.2 The Whole Process Before
Collaboration
In this section we show how our game theoretic model
can be used from scratch. That is, the players have two
datasets and they would like to know whether to train
together and with what privacy parameter. These ques-
tions can be answered with the help of the CoL game,
but first its parameters must be established. A process
diagram describing the whole process is presented in
Fig. 8.
Fig. 8. The process diagram which describes what are the steps
of the players before collaboration
– Initialization: The players have their datasets Dn
with the corresponding privacy policies Pn and the
accuracy they achieve by training alone θn.
– Setup: Based on the size of the datasets |Dn| and
the privacy policies Pn, the players determine which
privacy preserving methodM to use, what benefit b
and cost c function to apply, and what should be the
corresponding weight parameters C1, B1, C2, B2.
– Split: Based on the dataset size ratio |Dn|/|Dm|,
the players split their own datasets into two
Dn1, Dn2 to mimic the original datasets.
– Approximation: Based on the newly created
datasets Dn1, Dn2 and the accuracy obtained by
training alone θn, the players approximate the ac-
curacy improvement of training together Φ˜n.
– Game: Using the approximated privacy-accuracy
trade-off function Φ˜n and M, b, c, C1, B1, C2, B2 de-
termined by the setup phase, the players determine
the NE (ε∗1, ε∗2)n and its corresponding Price of Pri-
vacy value via the CoL game.
– Collaboration: If the approximation suggest that
training together is beneficial for both participant
(i.e., ∀n ∈ {1, 2} : u˜n(ε∗1, ε∗2) > 0), than they collab-
orate using their dataset Dn with the approximated
optimal privacy parameter ε∗n.
As we focused mainly on the “Game” step and partially
on the “Approximation” step, we manually chose the
parameters determined by the “Setup” phase. In this ex-
ample we choose bDP as privacy-preserving mechanism
M . We assume that players have a chunk of the pre-
processed NF rating dataset, which contains only movie
ratings. As such, it is expected that the players value
privacy less than accuracy: for the sake of this example,
we set B1 = B2 = 1 and C1 = C2 = 0.1. We use the
benefit and privacy loss functions defined in Eq. (4).
As we argued previously, self-division is the most
punctual when Eq. (12) holds. Since the density of the
original NF dataset is d ≈ 0.01, we assign both players
datasets with 10 million ratings: we randomly choose
20% of the users from NF10 and assign them to either
one of the players.
The players separately approximate Φn by self-
division, therefore, Φ˜1 and Φ˜2 are not necessarily the
same. The exact values of these approximations can be
seen in App. F together with the true value of Φn.7 We
found that the RMSE of Φ˜n is around 0.001 for both
players.
Using Φ˜1 Player 1 approximates the NE as
(p˜∗1, p˜∗2) = (0, 0) while Player 2 reaches the same con-
clusion via Φ˜2. This means Price of Privacy is zero.
The approximated utilities are u˜1 = 0.18 and u˜2 = 0.07
respectively. The actual utilities in case of (p˜∗1, p˜∗2) are
(0.21, 0.07), which are very close to the approximated
values. While utility approximation is fairly accurate,
7 Note, that Φn itself is interpolated from its actual value at
measured points.
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Φn actually corresponds to a slightly different NE:
(p∗1, p∗2) = (0.2, 0.2) with utility (u1, u2) = (0.14, 0.06)
and PoP = 0.25. Note, that while both players obtain a
higher payoff via p˜∗n that is not an actual NE.
9 Related Work
We divide related literature into two groups based on
the two main topic of this paper: distributed ML and
GT.
9.1 Distributed Machine Learning
ML is frequently implemented in a distributed fashion
for efficiency reasons. To tackle its emerging privacy
aspect, Privacy Preserving Distributed ML was intro-
duced, where the locally trained models are safely ag-
gregated.
Distributed training scenarios unanimously assume
a large number of participants and the involvement
of a third party such as in [PRR10, RA12, HCB16,
MMR+16, PZ16]. In more details, in [PRR10] mutually
untrusted parties train classifiers locally and aggregate
them with the help of an untrusted curator. In the in-
troduced ε-DP protocol, achieved accuracy depends on
the number of parties and the relative fractions of data
owned by the different parties. In [RA12] these depen-
dencies were eliminated for a SGD training algorithms.
On the other hand, authors used (ε, δ)-DP, a weaker
form of DP.
More recently in [HCB16] an ε-DP classifier was in-
troduced with error bound O((εN)−2) compared to the
result of the non-private training where N is the number
of participants. This approach results in strong privacy
guarantees without performance loss for large N . Feder-
ated Learning introduced in [MMR+16] follows another
approach, where the users generate pairwise noise to
mask their data from the aggregator. The bottleneck
of this approach is the communication constraints. Fur-
thermore, the solution is not applicable to two partici-
pants.
All these works assumed the existence of a third-
party aggregator; however, in our work the data holders
themselves train a model together to achieve higher ac-
curacy than what they would have obtained if training
in isolation. Furthermore, all of these works are neither
suitable nor efficient for two participants.
9.2 Game Theory
In [PZ16] the learning process was modeled as a Stack-
elberg game amongst N + 1 players where a learner de-
clares a privacy level and then the other N data holders
respond by perturbing their data as they desire. The
authors concluded that in equilibrium each data holder
perturbs its data independently of the others, which
leads to high accuracy loss.
The closest to our work are [IL13, CGL15,
WWK+17]. In [IL13] a linear regression scenario was
studied where the features were public but the data were
private. With these settings, the authors proved the ex-
istence of a unique non-trivial NE, and determined its
efficiency via the Price of Stability.
A simpler problem was modeled in [CGL15]: esti-
mating a population’s average of a single scalar quan-
tity. The authors studied the interaction between agents
and an analyst, where the agents can either deny access
to their private data or decide the level of precision at
which the analyst gets access. Findings include that it
is always better to let new agents enter the game as it
results in more accurate estimation, and the accuracy
can further be improved if the analyst sets a minimum
precision level.
In both previous scenarios, players would like to
learn a model which represents the whole population.
The accuracy of the estimate is a public good (i.e., non-
exclusive and non-rival [HS+88]). On the contrary, in
CoL the players seek to selfishly improve their own ac-
curacy as that is in their own self-interest. As such, they
measure the accuracy of the trained model by how well
it fits to their own datasets, which can result in differ-
ent accuracy levels. Furthermore, these works focused
on particular tasks (linear regression and scalar aver-
aging) while our model is applicable for any training
mechanism.
[WWK+17] studied the problem of private infor-
mation leakage in a data publishing scenario where
datasets are correlated. As such, the utility function for
an agent consists of the benefit of publishing its own san-
itized dataset and the privacy leakage which depends on
the privacy parameters of all involved agents. Opposed
to this, in our model the datasets are independent while
the benefit is affected by all the players’ actions. Thus,
the accuracy of the training depends on the privacy pa-
rameters of both agents, while the privacy loss depends
only on the privacy parameter of a single agent.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we designed a Collaborative Learning pro-
cess among two players. We defined two player types
(privacy concerned and unconcerned) and modeled the
training process as a two-player game. We proved the
existence of a Nash Equilibrium with a natural assump-
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tion about the privacy-accuracy trade-off function (Φ)
in the general case, while provided the exact formula
when one player is privacy unconcerned. We also defined
Price of Privacy to measure the overall degradation of
accuracy due to the player’s privacy protection.
On the practical side, we studied a Recommenda-
tion System use case: we applied two different privacy-
preserving mechanisms (suppression and bounded dif-
ferential privacy) on two real-world datasets (Movie-
Lens, Netflix). We confirmed via experiments that the
assumption which ensures the existence of a Nash Equi-
librium holds. Moreover, as a complementary work be-
sides the designed game, we interpolated Φ for this use
case, and devised a possible way to approximate it in
real-world scenarios. Our main findings are:
– Privacy protection degrades the accuracy heavily for
its user.
– Collaborative Learning is practical when either one
player is privacy unconcerned or the players have
similar dataset sizes and both players’ privacy con-
cerns (weights) are relatively low.
Future work. There are multiple opportunities to im-
prove this line of work such as upgrading the CoL pro-
cess by controlling the other party’s updates. Another
possibility is to design a repetitive game where each
player faces a decision after each iteration or make the
game asymmetric by defining the weights B and C in
private. Incorporating the impact of the potential ad-
versarial aspect for competing companies, and thus in-
vestigating a more elaborate utility function is another
intriguing possibility. Finally, as complementary work,
how to determine the weight parameters for specific sce-
narios and how to approximate Φ is crucial for the us-
ability of the model in the real world.
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Appendices
A List of Abbreviations
Abr. Meaning
ML Machine Learning
MF Matrix Factorization
SGD Stochastic Gradient Descent
DP Differential Privacy
Sup Suppression
RecSys Recommender System
CoL Collaborative Learning
PoP Price of Privacy
GT Game Theory
NE Nash Equilibrium
BR Best Response
Table 6. Frequently used abbreviations
B Proofs for Sec. 4
Proof Th. 1. Without loss of generality, assume Player
2 sets p2 = 1. The highest accuracy Player 1 can achieve
corresponds to p1 = 0 due to the Def. 3 and 4. From Def.
4 we can also deduce that if one player sets its privacy
parameter to maximal 1 then neither of the players can
obtain higher accuracy by training together than train-
ing alone. As such, the highest accuracy what Player 1
can reach by training together when Player 2 sets its pri-
vacy parameter to maximum is less than what it would
achieve by training alone: Φ1(0, 1) ≥ θ1. Note that Φ
and θ measures the error, i.e., the higher these values
are, the less accurate the corresponding model is.
As such, p1 = 0 does not correspond to positive ben-
efit but only results in privacy loss. Hence, the highest
payoff Player 1 can reach is 0 corresponding to maximal
privacy protection p1 = 1. In other words, if Player 2
sets p2 = 1 the BR of Player 1 is also to set p1 = 1. Since
this is also true on the other way around, (p∗1, p∗2) = (1, 1)
is indeed a NE which is equivalent to the case of training
alone.
Proof L. 1. If αn = 0, the utility function in Eq. (1)
is reduced to un = Bn · b(θn,Φn) since Cn = 0. This
is strictly positive by definition. Also by definition b is
monotone decreasing in pn. As a result, the utility is
highest when no privacy protection is in place. As such,
indeed exists αn such that pˆn = 0 is the BR for player
n.
Proof L. 2. Without loss of generality we assume n = 1.
We show that maxp1 u1(p1, p2) = u1(1, p2) = 0 if C1 →
∞ which is equivalent with the statement in Lemma 2:
lim
C1→∞
u1(p1, p2) =
lim
C1→∞
B1 · b(θ1,Φ1(p1, p2))− c(p1) · C1 ≤
lim
C1→∞
B1 · b(θ1,Φ1(0, 0))− c(p1) · C1 =
lim
C1→∞
β0 − c(p1) · C1 =
{
β0 if c(p1) = 0
−∞ if c(p1) > 0
(13)
As a result, u1(p1, p2) ≤ β0 for some β0 ≥ 0 and it
can only be non-negative if c(p1) = 0 which corresponds
to p1 = 1. The utility is maximal in this case, thus,
maxp1 u(p1, p2) = u(1, p2) which is indeed 0.
Proof Th. 2. In the proof of Lemma 1 we set Cn = 0 in
which case player n’s BR was indeed pˆn = 0. For more
details read the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof Th. 3. The utility function u(p1) is maximal in
the interval [0, 1] either on the border or at a point where
its derivative is zero. The derivative of Eq. (1) is
u′(p1) = B1b′(p1)Φ′(p1)− C1c′(p1) (14)
which is zero at p˜1 if
u′(p˜1) = 0⇒ b
′(p˜1)Φ′(p˜1)
c′(p˜1)
= C1
B1
(15)
Of course the extreme point p˜1 must be in [0, 1] and
u(p˜1) > 0. Furthermore, this extreme point is only max-
imum when the second derivative is negative.
On the other hand, if Eq. (14) is never zero on [0, 1]
or the second derivative is positive at that point, the
maximum of u(p1) is on the edge of the interval [0, 1].
u(1) = 0 since both the benefit and the privacy loss
function is zero at p1 = 1. As a result, p1 = 0 is the
maximum point if u(0) > 0. This is indeed the case
when the maximal benefit b(0) is higher than the ratio
of the privacy and accuracy weight C1B1 as it is shown
below:
0 < u(0) = B1b(0)− C1 ⇒ b(0) > C1
B1
Proof Th. 4. We divide un by Bn: u˜n = unBn . This new
function inherits the properties of un (such as the sign,
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monotonicity, maximum/minimum points, etc.). As a
result, a similar game with utility function u˜n has the
same equilibria. Furthermore, this similar game is a po-
tential game if the mixed second order partial derivative
of the utility functions are equal. Due to the constitu-
tion of u˜n, this condition is equivalent to
∂p1∂p2b(θ1,Φ1(p1, p2)) = ∂p1∂p2b(θ2,Φ2(p1, p2))
This formula can be transformed into the one in the
theorem by applying the chain rule for higher dimen-
sions.
Proof Col. 1. The left side of the equation in Th. 4 is
zero since we assumed ∂p1Φ1 = ∂p2Φ2. On the right side
∂p1∂p2Φ2 = ∂2p1Φ1 and ∂p2∂p1Φ1 = ∂
2
p2Φ2 for the same
reason. This means Th. 4 holds since both sides of the
equation are 0.
C Proof of Theorem 5
Proof Th. 5. Since the user set of the players are dis-
joint while the item set are shared, the only thing the
players need to share is the item feature matrix Q. The
effect of a single update is shown in Eq. (8). We as-
sume that the data points are independent, hence, the
sensitivity S˜ of one update is
S˜ = max
rui
|q′ki − qki| = maxrui [γ(euipuk − λqki)]
≤ γ(∆rpmax + λqmax)
where
– k ∈ [1, κ]
– ∆r is the maximal distance of two ratings: ∆r =
max rui −min rui
– pmax and qmax are the maximal absolute value of
the user and item features respectively.
S˜ is the sensitivity of updating a single feature, thus,
to capture the full effect of the update on the vector qi,
we need to multiply S˜ with the qi’s dimension κ. More-
over, we have only considered the effect of a rating on Q
within one iteration. However, this occurs ι times. Thus,
to achieve ε-DP, we need to apply κ·ι·S˜ε level of Lapla-
cian noise on the ratings before the training due to the
Composition Theorem. Therefore, the overall sensitivity
is indeed bounded by the formula in the theorem.
D Preprocessing
1 Remove items/users with less than 10 ratings.
2 For each remaining items, calculate the average rat-
ing and discount it from the corresponding rui’s:
r′ui := rui − IAvg(i)
3 For each remaining user, calculate the average rat-
ing and discount it from the corresponding r′ui’s:
r′′ui := r′ui − UAvg(u) = rui − IAvg(i)− UAvg(u)
4 The discounted ratings as well as the averages are
clamped:
– IAvg(i) ∈ [min(rui),max(rui)] = [1, 5]
– UAvg(u) ∈ [−2, 2]
– r′′ui ∈ [−2, 2]
E Self-Division: Experiment
1 We create datasets with approximately the same
density but with different size:
– 1M: We modify the size of the dataset while
keeping its density: we randomly removing
users such that the remaining dataset has
1000k/800k/600k ratings (i.e., the players have
500k-500k/400k-400k and 300k-300k ratings).
– NF10D: We create a new dataset originated
from NF10 by increasing its density to the level
of 1M via filtering out the less rated items8. Af-
terwards we modify the size of this dataset while
keeping its newly acquired density: we randomly
removing users such that the remaining dataset
has 8m/6m/4m/2m ratings.
2 We execute CoL with pi ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6} for
i = {1, 2} and for M ∈ {Sup, bDP} using the
newly created datasets (e.g., the players have
300k/400k/. . . /3m/4m ratings) and we obtain the
normalized accuracy improvement for both player:
Φ′i =
θi−ΦMi
θi
.
3 We execute CoL with the same privacy parameters
and methods using only one player’s data: the play-
ers imitate CoL by halving their own datasets (e.g.,
the datasets sizes are 150k-150k/. . . /2m-2m) and
we obtain Φ˜′ = θ˜n−Φ˜
M
n
θ˜n
where θ˜n and Φ˜n corre-
sponds to the average of the accuracies using the
two half of player n’s data.
8 We remove the items which have less than 250 ratings
18
4 We calculate the RMSE between the original nor-
malized accuracy Φ′ and the approximated normal-
ized accuracy via self-division Φ˜′ for both players
and privacy methods.
Fig. 9. We show the error (RMSE) of self-division (i.e., Φ′ − Φ˜′)
for both player and privacy methods.
We found, that the RMSE was minimal for both privacy
mechanism and player when the players have |Dn| =
2 000 000 ratings. This means, for datasets with density
approximately d = 0.05 Φ˜′n is the closest to Φ′n when
100 000 ≈ d · |Dn| heuristic holds.
F Playerwise Approximations
Φ˜1 p2 = 0.0 p2 = 0.2 p2 = 0.4 p2 = 0.6
p1 = 0.0 0.28 0.26 0.24 −0.05
p1 = 0.2 0.25 0.16 0.15 −0.05
p1 = 0.4 −0.07 −0.10 −0.19 −0.37
p1 = 0.6 −1.01 −1.16 −1.37 −1.72
Φ˜2 p1 = 0.0 p1 = 0.2 p1 = 0.4 p1 = 0.6
p2 = 0.0 0.17 0.16 0.15 −0.05
p2 = 0.2 0.14 0.12 0.12 −0.07
p2 = 0.4 −0.14 −0.17 −0.28 −0.60
p2 = 0.6 −1.19 −1.21 −1.28 −1.83
Φ1 p2 = 0.0 p2 = 0.2 p2 = 0.4 p2 = 0.6
p1 = 0.0 0.17 0.14 0.11 −0.03
p1 = 0.2 0.15 0.12 0.08 −0.26
p1 = 0.4 −0.13 −0.19 −0.33 −0.69
p1 = 0.6 −1.16 −1.32 −1.49 −2.08
Φ2 p1 = 0.0 p1 = 0.2 p1 = 0.4 p1 = 0.6
p2 = 0.0 0.31 0.23 0.17 −0.05
p2 = 0.2 0.31 0.22 0.11 −0.18
p2 = 0.4 −0.14 −0.16 −0.22 −0.52
p2 = 0.6 −1.13 −1.25 −1.30 −1.85
Table 7. The approximated privacy-accuracy tradeoff function for
both players (Φ˜1, Φ˜2) and its true value (Φ1 and Φ2).
